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ESSAY
EXPLANATION IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
THE INFERENTIAL STRUCTURE OF
DOCTRINAL LEGAL ANALYSIS
W Bradley Wendelt
INTRODUCTION

Consider a type of argument that is familiar in legal scholarship,
such a commonplace in fact that its structure may lurk unnoticed in
the background by the reader. The argument proceeds like this: (1)
Here is some legal doctrine or rule; (2) courts and scholars (or at least
my rivals) tend to think that its point, rationale, purpose, or function
is X-that is, the doctrine is "all about" X (3) but I think they're mistaken, and the doctrine is really "all about" Y; (4) here is some evidence supporting my claim; (5) therefore, we should understand the
point of this rule or doctrine as Y As an example of this pattern of
argument, take a recent paper on the consideration doctrine in contract law. In a classic article, Lon Fuller argued that the consideration
doctrine aims to accomplish three purposes: to provide evidence that
a contract was entered into, to slow down the contracting parties and
cause them to memorialize carefully the terms of their agreement,
and most importantly to channel the interactions of parties into legally effective transactional forms.' Two modern authors claim, however, that the consideration doctrine "lack[s] a sound theoretical
justification." 2 Under this argument, received wisdom among contracts scholars is mistaken; the distinction between promises that will
be enforceable without consideration and those that are legally unenforceable should actually be understood as a way to make anticommodification norms more robust. That is, treating certain kinds of
promises as market transactions violates social taboos. 3 The considert Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks to participants in faculty workshops at
Cornell and the University of Southern California for feedback. Scott Altman, Alexander
Capron, Ori Herstein, Greg Keating, Oskar Liivak, Jeff Rachlinski, and Gideon Yaffe provided particularly helpful comments. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Sarah
Horsch.
1 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
2 David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing the
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2006).
3 See id.
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ation doctrine therefore should be understood in terms of the value
of anticommodification, in the sense that requiring consideration for
certain types of promises and not others reinforces the social norm
that some promises should not be given the same legal significance as
arms-length commercial transactions.4
This Essay is aimed at understanding what kind of logical inference underwrites the conclusion that some area of law is "all about"
some end or value. It is a contribution to the metatheory of law-that
is, it is a theory about what makes theories more or less acceptable.
To put it another way, it is an account of explanation in law. The inferential move analyzed here is familiar in legal theory, yet it is ironically
undertheorized by those who employ it. This Essay therefore draws
from the resources of the philosophy of science, in which the methodology of inference to the best explanation (IBE) has been thoroughly
analyzed.5 The analogy with scientific explanation does not depend
on a close correspondence with the methods of the empirical sciences. I am not trying to make some kind of Langdellian claim here
that the analytic techniques of legal thought are essentially scientific,
although I do think many legal scholars are unwittingly continuing
the Langdellian project. (More specifically, there may not be as much
theoretical space between Langdell and Dworkin as legal scholars generally assume, a point to which I will return later.) Rather, the reason
for invoking IBE in science is to suggest that legal scholarship, in its
effort to render some area of law intelligible by positing an explana4

See id. at 1322.
See generally ExPLANATION: THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND APPLICATIONS 1-136 (Giora Hon & Sam S. Rakover, eds., 2001) (collecting essays on IBE); PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 55-64 (2d ed. 2004); ROBERT NOLA & HoWARD SANKEY,
THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 119-30 (2007); WESLEY C. SALMON, FOUR DECADES OF ScIENTIFIc EXPLANATION (1989) [hereinafter SALMON, FOUR DECADES]; THEORIES OF EXPLANATION (Joseph C. Pitt, ed., 1988); BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE 19-23 (1980);
DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE REASONING 20-22, 23-26 (2004); Timothy Day & Harold
Kincaid, PuttingInference to the Best Explanation in lts Place, 98 SYNTHESE 271 (1994) (defending IBE's role in philosophical argumentation and assessing debates over IBE in arguments
for scientific realism); Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation,74 PHIL. REV.
88 (1965) (arguing that many instances appearing to be enumerative induction are in fact
instances of inference to the best explanation); Steven Rappaport, Inference to the Best Explanation: Is It Really Different from Mill's Methods?, 63 PHIL. Sa. 65 (1996) (concluding that
Lipton's account of IBE does not sufficiently distinguish IBE from other models); Paul R.
Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteriafor Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76 (1978) (developing a

5

set of criteria that enhance accounts of IBE and the justification of scientific theories). For
the role of explanation in the social sciences, see generally JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7-74 (2007) [hereinafter EL
STER, ExPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR] (advocating for causal explanation); JON EIsrER, MAKINC SENSE OF MARX 3-48 (1985) (discussing the role of dialectics in explanation); ALAN
GARFINKEL, FORMS OF EXPLANATION: RETHINKING THE QUESTIONS IN SOCIAL THEORY (1981)
(examining the criteria for good explanation in social and natural science); MERRILEE H.
SALMON, PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 84-111 (1982) (describing the use of functional

explanation in archaeology).
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tion, tacitly appeals to criteria for inferring to the best explanation.
The arguments back and forth about the theoretical justification of
some doctrine are actually appeals to these criteria for theory selection. The overall strategy of this analysis is to derive conditions of
explanatory adequacy from the answer to the pragmatic question,
"what good are explanations?"6 This Essay aims to begin with this
question in law-"what good are legal explanations?"-and proceed
from there through some foundational issues in jurisprudence, such
as the autonomy of legal reasoning, the objectivity of law, and the role
of morality (if any) in the explanation and justification of law and
legal authority.
While a few scholars have given attention to these methodological considerations in different areas of law,7 so far the metatheory of
the dominant style of legal doctrinal analysis has not been well developed. An important exception, discussed at length below, is the literature on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law.8 Dworkin faces
6 SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 126-29. See Philip Kitcher, Explanatory
Unification, in THEORIES OF EXPLANATION, supra note 5, 167, 169-70 (taking the domain of
scientific theories as responses to "explanation-seeking why-questions"). I am taking this
question as the starting point, as opposed to beginning with other problems, such as what
we mean by scientific knowledge, in order to avoid numerous issues that are essential to the
philosophy of science but not relevant to this inquiry into the metatheory of law. An example would be the debate between scientific realists and critics like Bas van Fraassen over
whether scientific theories need only be empirically adequate or whether they must be
believed to be true. See vAN FRAASSEN, supra note 5 at 9-13; SALMON, FOUR DECADES, Supra
note 5, at 135-38. Another issue not germane to metatheory in law (and also explored by
van Fraassen) is the symmetry between explanation and prediction. See, e.g., BAS C. VAN
FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 86-88, 292-317 (1989).
7
See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 3-37 (2004); Jules Coleman, Tort
Law and Tort Theory: PreliminaryReflections on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS
183, 184 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (rejecting a top-down analysis of tort law and instead looking to whether social practices achieve corrective justice in order to assert the
claim that tort law is best explained by corrective justice); John C.P. Goldberg, TwentiethCentury Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 passim (2003) (analyzing five theories of tort law); Jody
S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication:A PhilosophicalDefense of
Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REv. 287, 287-88 (2007) (defending explanatory
economic analysis of the common law despite criticisms that such an explanation makes no
sense given judges' explicit use of deontic moral terms); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J.
Allen, JuridicalProof and the Best Explanation,27 LAw & PHIL. 223, 225 (2008) (arguing that
the process of inference to the best explanation explains the macrostructure of proof at
trial and the microlevel issues regarding the relevance and value of particular items of
evidence). See generally Kola Abimbola, Abductive Reasoning in Law: Taxonomy and Inference to
the Best Explanation, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 1683 (2001) (problematizing abductive explanation in real-life legal processes). For one general theory of evaluation in legal scholarship,
with very different methodological commitments than those defended here, see generally
Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAUF. L.
REv. 889 (1992).

For Dworkin's principal contributions to the metatheory of law, see generally RONLAw's EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE] (critiquing legal
positivism); RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) [hereinafter DWORIN, Hard Cases] (describing the questions judges must ask themselves in order
to determine the rights of litigating parties in difficult cases). For a particularly clear state8

ALD DwOIN,
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the metatheoretical question squarely but resolves it in a way that
many legal scholars do not accept, for he insists that an interpretation
of law must both fit with past political decisions and justify the decision in terms of the community's morality.9 If legal scholars reject the
Dworkinian approach, however, they have the burden of articulating
different criteria for theorizing legal explanation. Dworkin has an answer to the question, "what good are legal explanations?" His answer
has to do with the authority of law-that is, with connecting jurisprudential issues about the nature and validity of law to the role of law in
constituting political communities.1 0 Any adequate metatheory of law
must similarly connect an account of legal explanation to such
broader concerns.
This Essay considers only a certain type of legal-doctrinal explanation. The concern here is with explicit or tacit claims that some
rule or area of law is intelligible in light of some end, organizing principle, or some consideration of social policy. This plainly excludes
empirical scholarship that uses established social science methods."
Whatever one might say about the usefulness of empirical legal studies, the style of scholarship that creates a methodological puzzle for legal
scholars is one that is not based on observation and data analysis.

ment of Dworkin's position that shows the relationship between his conception of explanation and the arguments considered here, see RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33, 35 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle] ("Each
theory claims to provide the most illuminating account of what our actual constitutional
tradition, taken as a whole, really 'comes to'-of the 'point' or 'best justification' of the
constitutional system that has been developed in our own legal history."). For discussions
of metatheory in Dworkin, see S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, in
EXPLORING LAw's EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DwORIGN 69, 69 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006); Ken Kress, Coherentist Methodology is Morally Better Than Either Its Proponents or Its Critics Think (But Still Not Good Enough), 12 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 83, 83-107

(1999) (discussing Dworkinian coherentism); Kenneth

J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coher-

ence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Orderof Decisions, 72 CALIF.
L. REv. 369, 372-88 (1984); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv. 273,
303-09, 315-21 (1992); Arthur Ripstein, Introduction: Anti-Archimedeanism, in RONALD
DwoRIGN 1, 10-17 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism,50

SMU L. REv. 1679, 1706-07, 1715-17 (1997). While they certainly stand on their own as a
work of legal theory, Jules Coleman's Clarendon Lectures use Dworkin's theory as a foil
throughout, and can therefore be seen as an extended critique of Dworkin. SeeJULEs L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH To LEGAL
THEORY passim (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE].
9 See DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 96-98.
10 See id. at 87-113.
11
Cf Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2002)

(noting that even doctrinal work includes empirical arguments). As discussed in section II
below, statistical explanations such as those offered by empirical legal scholars are a recognized subset of scientific explanation. However, the inferential methods under consideration here are, at best, only analogous to explanation in the natural sciences and empirical

social sciences.
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My concern is also not with what I will call frankly normative arguments.12 A frankly normative argument is one that asserts that
some desirable state of affairs will be brought about if the law is understood in a particular way, or possibly reformed along certain lines.
Consider a hypothetical paper one might encounter, arguing that the
separation between investment banks and commercial banks created
by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 should be reimposed because doing
so would mitigate conflicts of interest that potentially expose depositors to excessive risks. The argument in that paper explains the proposed law instrumentally, with reference to some external end
(reduction of risk), and argues that the law would be justified to the
extent it accomplishes that end. It also assumes some intentional intervention by legal officials-in this case, passing new legislation.
The most important distinction between frankly normative arguments and those considered here, however, is that doctrinal legal
analysis, by its very nature, concerns itself with rhetorical practices that
are internal to law, avoiding reliance on extralegal normative considerations.' 3 Frankly normative arguments are also explicitly intentional. As discussed below in connection with functional explanation,
intentional acts are easy to explain in terms of an end state and an
agent's desire to bring it about. When combined with extralegal normative considerations (such as efficiency or justice), legal scholarship
that is frankly normative can be explained on a fairly standard pattern. One simply shows that the author believes a particular change
in the law would do well at bringing about some desired end.
By contrast with the hypothetical paper appealing explicitly to extralegal concerns, the sorts of arguments I am concerned with here
are not aimed at guiding the intervention of legal officials, at least not
12 The word "frankly" is important to differentiate these arguments from what may be
a tacit appeal to normative criteria in the type of argument considered here. To use a term
that was somewhat more current a decade or two ago, one might refer to frankly normative
arguments as pragmatic. See, e.g., Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American
Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragma-

tism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (1989). Richard Posner, who calls himself a pragmatist,
offers a brief overview and history of pragmatism in American law. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
So What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in OVERCOMING LAw 387, 387-95 (1995).
13 The decline of doctrinal legal scholarship has been noted for a long time. See, e.g.,
Harry T. Edwards, The GrowingDisjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REv. 34, 42-43 (1992) (noting the decline of "practical" legal scholarship, which
is doctrinal); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, The Triumphs and Travails of Legal Scholarship, in
OVERCOMING LAw, supra note 12, at 86 (1995) (contending that "[t]he legal doctrinalists

are being crowded by economic analysts of law, by other social scientists of law, by Bayesians, by philosophers of law, by political theorists, by critical legal scholars, by feminist and
gay legal scholars, by the law and literature people, and by critical race theorists, all deploying the tools of nonlegal disciplines"). While I have no empirical evidence of the
relative proportion of doctrinal, normative, and empirical legal scholarship, there still appears to be a market for doctrinal scholarship, as evidenced by the publication success
enjoyed by many producers of it.
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directly, and do not presuppose the intentional action of any human
agent. Rather, they take the law as given and attempt to render it
intelligible with reference to some overarching theoretical concern.
Frankly normative arguments are about the justification of some legal
norm. By contrast, the subject of this Essay is explanation, not justification. 14 As we will see, however, normativity creeps back into legal
scholarship in interesting ways. Indeed, a substantial goal of this Essay
is to make this covert normativity explicit so that it can be dealt with
on its own terms, rather than being handled indirectly under the
guise of logic, coherence, or simple gut-level, quasi-aesthetic responses.15 There is nothing wrong with legal explanation making reference to moral concerns. In fact, it may be the inevitable result of
the law's claim to legitimacy. In order for moral reasons to be relevant to legal explanation, however, they must be incorporated into the
materials of the law in some way. It may be the case that moral values
can become part of law-a "social fact" in jurisprudential terms-to
the extent that they play a role in the conventional practices of judicial reasoning.16 Thus, looking with some care at the rhetoric of legal
analysis may have some payoff in terms of making progress on other
theoretical debates, such as the controversy in jurisprudence over
whether source-based criteria are adequate to identify valid laws.
Here are some more examples, from various areas of legal scholarship, of the arguments for which an adequate metatheory should be
Cf COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 28-29 (distinguishing claims
that tort law ought to produce a certain outcome from explanations that refer to these
outcomes as the most plausible explanation of certain features of tort law).
15
Insofar as I understand it, this may be a similar aim of a well-known critical legal
studies paper, Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801,
809-11 (1991), although our approaches to the problem are quite different.
16
SeeJULES L. COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE
LAw 3, 4-5, 16 (1988) (discussing the "rule of recognition," a standard that determines
which of the community's norms are legal ones); Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich:
DistinguishingFeatures of Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LEGAL PosITISM 1, 16-19 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (examining moral judgments in the context
of legal positivism); E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a judge: The Hart/
Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473, 509-18 (1977) (discussing the relationship between
the law and morality); David Lyons, Principles,Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415,
416 (1977) (book review). Raz argues that one should be careful with the term "incorporation" of morality into law. See generallyJoseph Raz, Incorporationby Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1
(2004) (casting doubt on the idea that morals can become a part of the law through incorporation). In some cases, a court or administrative agency may have discretion to consider
X, and if Xis a moral principle, the law does not "incorporate" Xjust by reiterating that an
official may take X into account; in that instance, the law is merely being perfectly clear
that Xis not excluded. Id. at 14 ("[W]hat appears as incorporation is no more than an
indication that certain considerations are not excluded."). For Raz, the important thing is
the nonexclusion of morality by law because we are all bound by morality in any event. Id.
at 16-17. One may grant this point, however, and still believe there is an open question
concerning the role some consideration X plays when there is not an express grant of
discretion to the decision maker to take extralegal considerations into account.
14
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given. I am setting them out as the briefest possible blurb summaries
of these theories, which are obviously considerably more complicated
and subtle than I make them seem here. I have attempted to select
works from different areas of law and with different ambitions (some
dealing with one principle or doctrine, others taking on an entire legal subject), in the hopes that readers will be familiar with some of
these positions and recognize the inferential structure of the arguments that these theorists offer.1 7 The intention here is not to suggest
that these scholars are being imprecise, only that these are the types of
arguments we are trying to theorize. In fact, the analysis here is quite
careful, even if it is not always explicit about the underlying methodological issues.
1. Beebe on intellectualproperty.1 8 We tend to think that the purpose
of intellectual property law is to promote technological and cultural
progress by creating incentives for investing time and energy in creative enterprises.1 9 That is a mistake. In fact, the purpose of intellectual property-or, at least, what is coming to be a significant purpose
of intellectual property-is to enforce social hierarchy by facilitating
the construction of status-based individual and group identities, or at
least to preserve the capacity of people to differentiate themselves
from others through their patterns of consumption. 20 Intellectual
property laws can thus be explained as a means to sustain the possibility of making consumption-based distinctions in status.
2. Underkuffler on the notion of property.2 1 We hold multiple, conflicting ideas about the point of property law. Sometimes we see it as
granting stringent protection for individual rights, but in other cases,
we permit property-rights claims to yield to other public interests. 22
The variable power of property rights is predictable, and justified,
given the structure of property law. 23 The only way to make sense of
the idea of property is to see it as encompassing plural values.2 4 Any
17

In truth the selection principle is more like "works that came to my attention during the years I served on the faculty appointments committee, or that I otherwise ran
across in the course of my own scholarship."
18 See generally Barton Beebe, IntellectualProperty Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV.
L. REv. 809 (2010).
19 See id. at 813 ("To be sure, the express purpose and primary effect of intellectual
property law remains the prevention of misappropriation and the promotion of technological and cultural progress.").
20 See id. at 814.
21
See generally LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY. ITS MEANING AND
POWER (2003).
22
See id. at 64 (noting that under the operative conception of property, property law

identifies protected individual interests but also recognizes that these interests change as
the result of societal needs).
23
See id. at 75-84 (setting forth a model that predicts when claimed rights will and
should have trumping power).
24
See id. at 16-33.
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attempt at unifying the underlying values of property law is bound to
oversimplify, and thus fail to explain, its subject.
3. Markovits on contract law.2 5 Contract law scholars generally take
an individualistic perspective on the subject, assuming that the purpose of contract law is to promote individual freedom, protect the
expectations of other parties, or promote the efficient allocation of
resources (and therefore the welfare of both parties).26 But this
misses the point of contracts. Contracts should be understood as establishing relationships of respect and recognition, a kind of community, among those who enter into them.2 7 This is true even if the
contracting parties have basically self-interested motivations for entering into agreements. Thus, contract law is fundamentally all about
collaboration.
4. Luban on the attorney-clientprivilege.2 8 The traditional justification for the attorney-client privilege is that, without it, clients will not
be forthcoming with their lawyers and thus will receive less effective
representation.2 9 A better way to understand the rationale behind the
privilege, however, is to focus on the cruelty that would result from
putting a client in the situation of either revealing an incriminating
fact to her lawyer, remaining silent, or lying to the lawyer.3 0 Being
required to testify against oneself-which is effectively what would
happen in the absence of the attorney-client privilege-is a core instance of humiliation and violation of human dignity.3 1 Thus, we
should see the attorney-client privilege as aimed at protecting human
dignity.
5. Siegel on justiciability.3 2 Standing and other justiciability doctrines are a puzzle. Scholars have explained these doctrines as giving
litigants a stake in disputes 3 3 or giving courts some wiggle room to
avoid making socially divisive rulings3 4 (as occurred in the NewdowP5
case on the Pledge of Allegiance). These explanations are inadequate, however, and a better understanding ofjusticiability would emphasize its role in ensuring that courts rule only on the legality, as
opposed to the wisdom, of actions by other branches of government.3 6
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32
33

34
35

See generally Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
See id. at 1419.
See id. at 1420.
See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 80-88 (2007).
See id. at 80.
See id. at 81.
See id.
See generally Jonathan R Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEX. L. REv. 73 (2007).
See id. at 87.
See id. at 108.

See generally Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
36 See Siegel, supra note 32, at 125.
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6. Coleman on the tort system.37 Economic analysis is a bad explanation of tort law.38 Economic analysis says that torts is all about welfaremaximization.3 9 The negligence standard, for example, indicates
which precautions are cost justified and which need not be taken. 40
However, economic analysis fails to explain certain core concepts in
tort law, such as duty, wrong, and responsibility. The rival account of
corrective justice is a better explanation of tort law because it better
accounts for observed features of the law (such as the duty element)
and the relationship among the constitutive elements of tort law. 4 1
I

A BRIEF

OVERVIEW OF EXPLANATION IN THE SCIENCES

A brief caveat is necessary before considering explanation in the
natural sciences. My claim is not that science is the model of all inquiry. There are many intellectual problems that call for explanation.
History, anthropology, literature, and art can all prompt the question,
"what is that all about?" 42 In the arts, we are accustomed to thinking
in terms of interpretation, not explanation, and thus might wonder
why a metatheory of legal scholarship should not focus on interpreta37

COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8. Coleman's book is particularly in-

teresting because he first works through methodological issues with some care and uses
what I take to be an IBE methodology to defend his preferred conception of the role of
tort law.
38 See id. at 23.
3
See id. at 16.
40
See id. at 14.
41
See id. at 21.
42 There is an enormous literature on explanation in history and other social sciences. See, e.g., R.F. ATKINSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ExPLANATION IN HISTORY 95-139 (1978);
R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 1-13 (Jan van der Dussen ed., rev. ed. 1993)
(exploring the philosophy of history); ARTHUR C. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 201-57 (1965); WILLIAM DRAY, LAWS AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 79-85 (1960); PATRICK GARDINER, THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 65-112 (1952); HAYDEN WHITE,

METAHISTORY 13-31 (1973). See generally W.W. Bartley III, Achilles, the Tortoise, and Explanation in Science and History, 13 BRIT.J. PHIL. SCI. 15 (1962);Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the Moral
Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 91 (1997) (defending ethical explanations while using slavery
as a framework); Alan Donagan, Explanation in History, 66 MIND 145 (1957) (describing
Popper's hypodeductive scheme of causal explanation); Tor Egil Forland, The Ideal Explanatory Text in History: A Plea for Ecumenism, 43 HisT. & THEORY 321 (2004) (applying an
analysis of scientific explanation to historiography); E.W. Strong, Criteria ofExplanation in
History, 49J. PHIL. 57 (1952) (asking what is required methodologically to study historical
documents and what the nature of explanation in history is). Interestingly, the philosophy
of history is largely derived from the philosophy of the natural sciences. The starting point
for much of the analytical literature on the philosophy of history (as opposed to works by
historians, such as Collingwood) is Carl Hempel's 1942 paper. See Carl G. Hempel, The
Function of General Laws in History, 39 J. PHIL. 35 (1942), reprinted in CARL G. HEMPEL, AsPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER EssAYs IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 231
(1965) [hereinafter HEMPEL, ASPECTS]. Thus, broadening the inquiry here to include the
philosophy of history may actually not result in as much of a payoff as one might initially
think.
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tion. Law, as a human artifact may be subject to interpretation in the
same way as a work of art or a ritual like a rain dance.4 3 As the following discussion makes clear, I do not argue that legal explanation is just
like scientific explanation. Legal explanations, however, do aspire to
some of the same virtues that characterize good explanations in science, such as elegance, parsimoniousness, and consilience. Moreover,
there may be little difference between an explanation and an interpretation once we understand how scientific explanation works.
Among other things, science aims to provide an explanation of
observed phenomena in the natural world. 4 4 Accordingly, a substantial part of the metatheoretical project in the philosophy of science
has been to understand what is involved in providing a scientific explanation. Science may also have other, more instrumental goals,
such as developing potentially useful new technologies, but one of the
principal ends of science is to answer "why?" questions about the
world, and that is what it means to explain. 45 Additionally, philosophers of science may be concerned with questions such as whether
science aims to discover knowledge, how we can infer from observation to truths about the unobservable world, and whether there really
are entities such as electrons and DNA, and properties such as mass,
electrical charge, and the like. Scientific realists argue that science is
aimed at discovering truth about the world, including unobservable
phenomena; antirealists of various sorts contend in response that science is instead about prediction, controlling the environment, or discovering truth, but only with respect to observable phenomena
(empirical adequacy).46 By narrowing our focus to scientific explana43
One might contend that explanation in humanities disciplines like history and
humanistically influenced disciplines like cultural anthropology, inevitably involves interpretation. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 24-28 (1973); see also ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 52-74. As discussed below in section II,
the notion of interpretation is central to Dworkin's jurisprudence. See DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 50, 90-92, discussed infra notes 125-32.
44
Cf VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 5, at 6-7.
45 Id. at 134.
46
See the helpful overview of scientific realism and antirealism in NOLA & SANKEY,
supra note 5, at 337-41. For prominent realist arguments, see generally STATHIS PSILLOS,
SCIENTIFIC REALISM: How SCIENCE TRACKS TRUTH (1999); HILARY PUTNAM, MEANING AND
THE MORAL SCIENCES (1978). For important antirealist positions, see generally LARRY
LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND VALUES: THE AIMs OF SCIENCE AND THEIR ROLE IN SCIENTIFIC DEBATE
(1984); VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 5. Note that the argument structure here-namely that
science is "about" such-and-such an aim-is the same type of argument with which we are
concerned in legal scholarship. Thus, what for philosophy of science is an issue of
metamethodology is a second-order metatheoretical question in law. See NoLA & SANKEY,
supra note 5, at 81 (distinguishing scientific theories, scientific methodologies, and
metamethodologies). The metamethodological question is a vigorously contested one in
the philosophy of science, see, e.g., WESLEY C. SALMON, Why Ask, "Why?"?:An Inquiry Concerning Scientic Explanation, in CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION 125, 125 (1998) [hereinafter
SALMON, CAusALrY], and will not be pursued here, except as an analogy. It is interesting
to note, however, that the Supreme Court has called upon judges to determine, in some
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tion, we can avoid some of these difficult theoretical issues. That is, by
focusing on the goal of explanation in science, we can draw useful
analogies between the values endorsed as criteria for assessing the adequacy of scientific theories and principles of theory-acceptance in legal scholarship. 47
The first part of the following discussion provides a quick and
dirty overview of the straightforward case of explanation in science
using inferences from general scientific laws. It also considers what
happens when we go the other way and try to work from observations
toward confirmation of a hypothesized scientific explanation. The
method of positing theoretical explanations and confirming them using empirical evidence is called hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) .48
The reason for going through this introduction is not to engage with
the myriad technical problems related to the H-D method, explanation, and confirmation, but to show the motivation for the rival
method of inference to the best explanation (IBE) and to begin to
flesh out some of the criteria for theory-acceptance that can be employed in legal explanations, by analogy with scientific explanations.
A.

The Standard Model: Deductive-Nomological Explanation
and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation

For much of the twentieth century, philosophers of science believed that scientific explanation was a matter of constructing arguments deducing the occurrence of some event from general laws of
nature. 4 9 This is the so-called deductive-nomological (D-N) model of
scientific explanation.5 0 The thing to be explained, the explanandum,
is shown to be related to the explanans, a set of premises with empirical content, which must contain at least one general law and which
also contains a description of the relevant background conditions.5 '
cases, whether an expert's proffered testimony is based on "scientific knowledge." Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
47
NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 34, 51. The distinction in the text is between
general aims or goals that are constitutive of a certain conception of science and more
specific norms that bring about the general aim. As I will argue below, a great deal turns
on what ends are assumed to be constitutive of the relevant activity, whether science or
academic legal scholarship.
48
For the classic paper, see generally CARL G. HEMPEL, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in HEMPEL, AsPEces, supra note 42, at 3 [hereinafter HEMPEL, Confirmation].
49 SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 8-10.
50
See CARL G. HEMPEL, Aspects ofScientific Explanation, in HEMPEL, ASPEcrs, supra note
42, at 335-47 [hereinafter HEMPEL, Aspects]. If the idiotic typeface rules in the Bluebook
are to have any function at all, here it would be to differentiate Hempel's paper, Aspects of
Scientific Explanation from the collection of papers by the same title.
51

See, e.g., RICHARD BEVAN

BRAYTHwArTE,

SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

12-21

(1955)

(describing the structure of a scientific system as a deductive system that includes a generalization and several levels of empirical hypotheses); CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49-51 (1966) [hereinafter HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY] (noting that an explanation
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The explanation takes the form of a deductive inference from the
general laws in the explanans to a conclusion, which is a description of
the empirical phenomenon to be explained. 5 2 That is the "deductive"
part of a model of explanation, which is the link between explanation
and a separate but related pattern of confirmation.5 3 We may be interested in offering a hypothesis to explain observed phenomena and
then finding out whether the hypothesis is true (or at least empirically
adequate).6 A hypothesis is just a statement being tested; it can be a
fairly discrete principle meant to explain observations (such as Torricelli's conjecture that the earth is surrounded by a sea of air that
exerts pressure on the surface below), a general scientific law (such as
Kepler's laws of planetary motion), or even an ambitious theory such
as natural selection or general relativity.5 5 In a simple, idealized piccan be formulated as a deductive argument whose conclusion is an explanandum whose
premises include the basic laws of science). Background conditions can include very general propositions about the nature of scientific inquiry. For example, an explanation in
terms of the positions of the stars for John F. Kennedy's assassination will not even make it
past the threshold as a scientific explanation in the twenty-first century. See Philip Kitcher
& Wesley Salmon, Van Fraassenon Explanation, 84J. PHIL. 315, 322 (1987).
52
See Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, 15 PHIL.
Sci. 135, 136-37 (1948), eprinted in HEMPEL, ASPECTS, supra note 42, at 247-49. There
must be constraints on what is "admissible" in the explanans. See id. at 137. A significant
issue for the Hempel/Oppenheim account is how to understand the requirement that
scientific laws be general. The statement, "[n]o gold sphere has a mass greater than
100,000 kg" is law-like and general in form, but it is nevertheless not a scientific law.
SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 15. Similarly, the argument "[c] rows are the color
of coal[;] [cloal is black[;] [t]herefore, [c]rows are black" is deductive, but it clearly is not
an explanation of why crows are black. PETER ACHINSTEIN, THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION
123 (1983).
53
It is common to blur the distinction between deductive-nomological (D-N) explanation and hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation because they function together in a
model of scientific method. When scientists explain something, they take confirmed scientific hypotheses to be true and use them to explain observed phenomena. The correctness
of the scientific hypothesis is presupposed by its use in an explanation. When testing a
hypothesis, by contrast, scientists are working in the other direction, taking the observations as given and using them to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis, whose correctness
is yet to be established. See LIPTON, supra note 5, at 27 ("The deductive-nomological model
should produce a sense of deyd vu, since it is isomorphic to the hypothetico-deductive
model of confirmation . . . ."); SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 7.
54
The qualification here is necessary to bracket questions about scientific realism. See
generally vAN FRAASSEN, supra note 5 at 6-13 (comparing scientific realism, which aims to
give a literally true story of what the world is like, with constructive empiricism, which aims
to give theories that are empirically adequate).
55 See HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, at 5-11. A brief note on the terminology of
theory and hypothesis: scientists use the term "theory" to refer to "the total set of those
basic theoretical principles that leads to experimentally testable consequences." Id. at
26-27. A theory can be tested by the H-D method, in which case it is appropriate to refer
to it as a hypothesis. A great deal of misunderstanding in the public discourse around
teaching evolution in public schools arises from the ordinary-language use of the word
"theory," which can be understood as meaning something like "conjecture." Thus, opponents of teaching evolution attempt to stigmatize it as something other than accepted scientific knowledge. A better term that would capture the way the word theory is used by
scientists would be Lakatos' idea of a scientific research program, which contains a hard
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ture, if predicted observations can be deduced from the hypothesis
and compared with experimental observations, we may be able to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis.5 6 So, for example, one may hypothesize that as-yet inexplicable variations in the movement of
Uranus can be explained by another planet, with a specified mass and
position; the hypothesis would then be confirmed by the observation
of a new planet, Neptune, with the predicted mass and position.5 7
Like the existence of Neptune, many D-N explanations are superficially causal but in fact refer to underlying regularities expressed by
scientific laws that function as a kind of shorthand for a more complex causal explanation. The expansion of a balloon may be explained by the ideal gas law, PV= nRT, even though the law does not
"cause" the balloon to expand.5 8 A genuinely causal explanation
would have to refer to principles of thermodynamics and how physical
quantities such as heat and pressure are related at the level of the
average kinetic energy of molecules. The ideal gas law is a noncausal
law, even though it refers to causal processes.5 9 Things get a bit more
complicated when the general scientific laws in the explanans refer to
statistical generalizations about causal processes.6 0 In Hempel's example, the explanation of the fact that patient John Jones recovered
from a streptococcus infection is thatJohnJones had been given penicillin. 6 1 Logically speaking, the explanandum cannot be deduced from
the explanans, but given a sufficiently high degree of association between the independent and dependent variables (administering penicillin and recovery from a streptococcus infection), the conclusion
core of fundamental postulates that are held to be true and which grows through phases of
theoretical development that are empirically progressive with respect to preceding stages.
See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 274-81 (discussing Lakatos). But this is obviously not
suitable for a bumpersticker description of what science is all about, and it is hard to come
up with a term that captures both the confidence in the fundamental postulates of a research program and the virtue of science (much emphasized by Popper) that it is
nondogmatic and always open to revision. See id. at 253 (citing Popper's views on the
virtues of scientific inquiry).
56
See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 170-76.
57 HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, at 52. Hardcore jurisprudence geeks will recognize the allusion here to Dworkin's argument that integrity is the yet-unappreciated
third political-moral value (along with fairness and justice) that was needed to explain our
intuition that unprincipled legislative compromises were illegitimate. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 183 (1986) ("Integrity is our Neptune.").
58
WESLEY C. SALMON, Comets, Pollen, and Dreams: Some Reflections

on Scientific Explanation, in SALMON, CAUSALITY, supra note 46, at 55, 59-60 [hereinafter SALMON, Comets] (explaining how the ideal gas law does not provide a causal explanation of the events that are
subsumed under it).
59 See id.
60
For a simple example, consider Pascal's demonstration that twenty-five is the minimum number of tosses required to yield a better than 50% chance of getting double sixes
with a pair of standard dice. See WESLEY C. SALMON, Scientific Explanation:How We Got From
There to Here, in SALMON, CAUSALITY, supra note 46, at 302, 307.
61
HEMPEL, Aspects, supra note 50, at 381-82.
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can be shown not to be certain, but to be predictable with a high
degree of inductive probability. There are constraints, beyond bare
probabilities, on what counts as a statistical explanation. Salmon
showed this using a bogus explanation:John Jones recovered from his
cold within a week because he took Vitamin C, and almost all colds
clear up within a week after taking Vitamin C.62 The problem with
this explanation, of course, is that almost all colds clear up within a
week anyway, regardless of taking Vitamin C. Thus, the facts cited in
the explanans must be tested to see whether they make a difference to
the probability of the explanandum.63
The idea of testing returns us to the problem of confirmation,
which will provide the background to contemporary debates about
IBE. Very roughly, take a hypothesis H, which can be any generalization, but in science is usually a natural law or theory offered to explain
observations. We would then like to use bits of evidence, El, E2 .... E,
to confirm or disconfirm H. It has long been understood that although confirmation is inductive, 64 it cannot be done in a straightforward enumerative way; simply toting up positive correlations between
a consequence of the hypothesis, C, and observed evidence En does
not logically confirm the hypothesis. In fact, the following argument
is fallacious (affirming the consequent):
If hypothesis H is true, then we would expect consequence C;
Consequence C is observed;

H is true. 65
Changing the logical form of the argument so that it is no longer
invalid still does not fix the problem with enumerative induction as a
method of confirmation, as Hempel famously showed with his ravens
paradox. 66 For the hypothesis, "all ravens are black," observing a
black raven tends to confirm the hypothesis while observing a nonblack raven tends to disconfirm it. Unfortunately, the hypothesis "all
non-black things are non-ravens" is logically equivalent to the hypothesis we are testing, so the observation of any non-black non-raven (a
white swan, for example, or an orange basketball), tends to confirm
62

SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 58-59.
Sophisticated statistical techniques for testing causal explanations
temporary empirical social science disciplines, including empirical studies
stein & King, supra note 11, at 19-114 (proposing rules to help empirical
64
See WESLEY C. SALMON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE
63

underpin conof law. See Epresearchers).
109 (1967).

51, at 7.
48, at 14-20. This is obviously only a suggestive
example because it does not express a scientific law that is of much interest, but the same
kind of relationship between a universal and its instantiations holds for laws like "[a]ll
metals expand when heated" or "[a]ll planets move in ellipses." See STATHIS PsiLLos, CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION 162-67 (2002) [hereinafter PsiLLos, CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION] (emphasis omitted).
65
66

HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note
HEMPEL, Confirmation, supra note
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the hypothesis.6 7 Intuitively, seeing lots of white swans has nothing to
do with whether we believe that all ravens are black, but "it has turned
out to be tantalizingly difficult to articulate [how induction can play]
even . .. a limited role [in confirming scientific hypotheses] "68
B.

Why IBE?

The inferential structure known as inference to the best explanation (IBE) is intended to circumvent the logical difficulties, including
the ravens paradox, in the use of enumerative induction as a method
of confirmation.6 9 It takes the following form:
El, E2, . . . E. are bits of evidence (observations, instances, facts,

what have you);
Hypothesis H explains E;, E2, ... E,;
No competing hypothesis, H*, explains El, E2 ,... En as well as H does;
Therefore, H is probably true.70
Note several things about this form of argument. First, it is inherently contrastive. The third step in the argument asserts that no rival
hypothesis H* does as well as Hat explaining the evidence. Without a
rival hypothesis, it would be nonsensical to talk about an explanation
being better or the best.7 1 Second, it is inherently normative. The
inference depends on H being better than H* at explaining the observed evidence, and this presupposes criteria-standards of judgment-for what makes a better or worse explanation. 72 Third,
although this is not explicit, the IBE argument works only if there is
some prior filter or constraint on what counts as a plausible hypothesis in a context. Some hypotheses are implausible explanations in
light of our background beliefs. For example, consider two rival hypotheses to explain how Michelangelo was able to paint the ceiling of
the Sistine Chapel: H = he built scaffolding and climbed up each day;
H*= he levitated up to the ceiling.73 Obviously, given what we know
67

See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 182-83 for a clear explanation of the ravens

paradox.
68
LwroN, supra note 5, at 15. See also NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 183 ("The task
for any theory of confirmation will be to remove the [ravens] paradox.").
69
See Harman, supra note 5, at 90-91 ("If ... we think of the inference as an inference to the best explanation, we can explain when a person is and when he is not warranted in making the inference from 'All observed A's are B's' to 'All A's are B's.'").
70
NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 121.
71
Cf Harman, supra note 5, at 89 ("[S]uch a judgment will be based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains more,
which is less ad hoc, and so forth.").
72
See Thagard, supra note 5, at 79.
73
This example is from NoLA & SANKEY. See supra note 5, at 124. Harman talks about
these background beliefs as lemmas that are obscured by seeing experimental confirmation as enumerative induction. See Harman, supra note 5, at 93; see also LProN, supranote
5, at 59 ("[I] t is important to notice that the live options version of potential explanation
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about the laws of physics generally, H* is not even a candidate for a
true explanation. Finally, the IBE argument concludes with a qualifier, "probably," to indicate that the inference yields something less
than certainty.74 In this way, IBE is nicely compatible with the way in
which science aspires to be open to critical scrutiny and revision.
Peter Lipton distinguishes between the likeliness of an explanation and its loveliness.75 The likeliest explanation is the one that is
the best warranted on the total available evidence. The loveliest explanation is the one that provides the deepest understanding.
Newtonian mechanics is a lovely explanation even though, given the
work of Einstein and others in the twentieth century, it is now not the
likeliest one.76 Lipton's insight is that we cannot solve the problems
of inductive confirmation with a model of inference that seeks the
likeliest explanation.7 7 Instead, we must infer contrastively, comparing candidate explanations to their rivals and assessing each for their
respective loveliness.7 8 Of course, what it means for an explanation to
be "lovely" is a matter for careful exploration, since a great deal rests
on this quasi-aesthetic standard. A substantial problem with IBE in
science, which will not be considered further here, is the question of
whether we have any warrant for believing that lovely explanations are
more likely to be true ones.79 In an inherently normative field like
legal scholarship, however, it may not be surprising that quasi-aesthetic criteria like loveliness have a central role in metatheory. Truth
in science is a different matter from truth in, say, the theory of property or contract law. An attractive theory in one of these latter disciplines will tend to possess aesthetic virtues like elegance, simplicity,
coherence, and perhaps the capacity to surprise. While one might
understandably wonder what these criteria have to do with empirical
reality, it makes more sense to see them as features of a good theory in
already assumes an epistemic 'filter' that limits the pool of potential explanations to plausible candidates.").
74 See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 122-23 (noting that "Rescher argues that we
should not draw the conclusion that H is true, or that it is reasonable to suspect that H is
true," but that we should rather conclude "only that H has greater verisimilitude than its
rivals").
75
76

See LIrON, supra note 5, at 59-61.
Id. at 60.

77
78

See id. at 60-61.
See id. at 61.

79

See, e.g., NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 129-30; VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 5, at 88

(discussing the virtues of a theory beyond empirical adequacy); see alsoJesse Hobbs, Book
Review, 60 PHIL. Sci. 679, 679 (1993) ("[T]he fact that S, if true, would be a better explanation than T cannot establish either that S is true or an actual explanation . . . ."); Peter
Milne, Book Review, 53 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 970, 971 (1993) (noting challenges to Lipton's theories in the course of reviewing his book); Jonathan Vogel, Book
Review, 102 PHIL. REV. 419, 420 (1993) (noting in reviewing Lipton's book the common
view that "it would be foolhardy or dogmatic to assume that explanatory adequacy and
truth coincide" ).
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a discipline that deals with values such as political legitimacy and
justice.
The classic example of an IBE argument in science is Darwin's list
of facts that can be explained by H, his theory of natural selection, but
are not as well explained by the rival hypothesis H*, that species had
been separately created by God.80 The presence of vestigial organs,
the variability in closely related species, the geographic distribution of
species, the sterility of hybrid species, and other observations are better explained by Darwin's theory,8 ' and this gives us a reason to believe that Darwin's theory is true. These observations are the
evidence, El, E2 ,... E,, in the argument above. The question is what it
means to assert that H, the theory of natural selection, does a better
job of explaining the observations than the rival hypothesis, H*, which
asserts the work of a Creator. There are numerous criteria for favoring one theoretical explanation over its rival or rivals. Each of these
criteria should be read with a ceteris paibus clause-that is, a clause
specifying that "all other things being equal, a theory should be preferred that . . . . "82 These criteria may also be in tension with each
other in some cases, in which case judgment will be required to balance them in deciding which theoretical explanation is the best one.8 3
The interesting question, to be discussed further in the next section in
connection with legal explanation, is how these criteria are generated
from higher-order considerations about the purpose of some activity-empirical science or law. Consider, for example, why we would
think that a simpler theory is more likely to be true. There seems to
be no reason to simply assume that the laws of nature are simple. 84
Simplicity is likely to be a pragmatic virtue, related to one of the principal virtues of science as a practice, namely its susceptibility to testing
and falsifiability. 85 Simplicity gains plausibility as a criterion for theory-acceptance in science because we have a prior commitment to a
80
See, e.g., LIProN, supra note 5, at 206; NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 120; Thagard,
supra note 5, at 77; see also PHILIP KITCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONIsm 50-54 (1982).
81
See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 120.
82
See LIProN, supra note 5, at 64.
83
For example, when fitting a curve to observed data, an experimenter may prefer a
curve that passes through more data points or is simpler. Two potential rules, "always
choose the simple curve" and "always choose the more complex curve," have opposing
virtues and vices. The "always simple" rule may lack empirical accuracy while the "always
complex" rule will deviate from the true curve because of noise in the data. Thus, some
judgment will be required to make the best tradeoff between considerations of fit and
simplicity. See NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 141. Paul Thagard insists that "[t]heories
must not achieve consilience at the expense of simplicity," Thagard, supra note 5, at 89, but
in some cases, the tradeoff may be inevitable.
84
See HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, at 42.
85
Id. at 44 (considering Popper's view).
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picture of the purpose of science in which testability is paramount.8 6
The "best" qualifier in IBE can therefore be seen as best-relative-to the
overall aim of science.
With that in mind, here are some criteria for theory selection in
science. As with virtually everything discussed in this section of the
Essay, there are technical complications involved with applying them,
and philosophers disagree over many details. Nevertheless, these are
the sorts of things that count as explanatory virtues in science.
1. Consilience. A theory is to be preferred when it explains more
of the observed evidence, El, E2 ,. .. E, than its rivals.87 Antoine Lavoisier's oxygen theory of combustion was better than the rival theory
that used a hypothetical substance, phlogiston, to explain combustion
because the oxygen theory could explain the fact that combusting
bodies increase in weight.8 8 Making oxygen, rather than phlogiston,
could serve as a conceptual bridge to other theories, such as
Newtonian mechanics.8 9 Similarly, Darwin's theory of natural selection was able to account for observations that initially seemed unrelated, such as those pertaining to anatomy (the presence of vestigial
organs) and zoology (the observed differences in related species).
Theories such as the oxygen theory of combustion are more powerful
when they are able to unify observations and link up with other seemingly disparate inquiries.
2. Simplicity. A theory should be preferred over its rivals if it
makes use of fewer independent postulates, axioms, fundamental
principles, or entities than are necessary to enable the theory to explain some observation, E. 9 0 The familiar inferential principle of
Ockham's razor tells us not to multiply entities without necessity.9 1
The classic example of preferring a simpler explanation is the replacement of Ptolemaic astronomy by the Copernican system. 92 The Ptolemaic system had become so cumbersome, and relied on so many ad
86
87

See id.
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, at 34 ("If the earlier cases have all been ob-

tained by tests of the same kind, but the new finding is the result of a different kind of test,
the confirmation of the hypothesis may be significantly enhanced."); Thagard, supra note
5, at 79 ("[O]ne theory is more consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts
than the other does."); see also EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE
266 (1998) (arguing for the unification of all human knowledge, including science and the
humanities). For the value of consilience in legal explanation, see COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 41-43.
88
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 69-72 (2d ed. 1970);
Thagard, supra note 5, at 77-78, 81.
89
KUHN, supra note 88, at 71.
90 Thagard, supra note 5, at 86.
91
See, e.g., NoLA & SANKEY, sup-a note 5, at 42.
92 KUHN, supra note 88, at 68-69. As Kuhn notes, Copernicus showed considerable
insight in seeing as disconfirming evidence what other astronomers viewed only as puzzles
to be solved by the application of Ptolemaic principles. Id. at 79.
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hoc assumptions to fit with the observed data, that astronomers were
warranted in believing that Copernicus had better explained the
movement of heavenly bodies.9 3 An assumption that explains no more
than that which it was introduced to explain is ad hoc, and a theory
that becomes encumbered with too many of these is less likely to be
the best explanation of observed data.9 4 In a similar way, phlogiston
chemistry had fragmented into numerous subtheories as chemists
struggled to account for laboratory results using explanations that depended upon phlogiston. One of the attractive features of the oxygen
theory was that it replaced all these different versions of phlogiston
chemistry with one simple, unified approach.9 5 One might question
whether reality is really simple, and therefore whether simplicity ought
to be a criterion of explanatory success.9 6 This observation suggests a
fault line between scientific realists and antirealists, the former who
assert that science does (or ought to) describe reality, and the latter
who are content with a theory of science that emphasizes virtues other
than truth-functional (alethic) ones. 97 Presumably, a realist would be
willing to abandon simplicity as a theoretical virtue if she were able to
show that reality is, in fact, quite complicated. Because assertions
about what is actually true of reality tend to depend on explanations
of observed phenomenon, however, alethic virtues seldom appear directly in a theory but come in indirectly via competing assumptions
about whether or not scientific laws that accurately describe reality are
simple.
3. Fruitfulness.9 8 A theory should enable us to say significant
things, generate insights, and have implications for future research.
When Newtonian mechanics replaced the classical view that material
bodies moved because of their inherent nature, they opened up new
realms of inquiry.9 9 Observations about, say, the behavior of colliding
bodies could be reinterpreted in light of the new laws of motion, and
these further findings could lead to a reinterpretation of other phenomena, such as the movement of particles in a gas. Experiments on
these particles might then lead to further discoveries about the relationship between the macroscopic and microscopic worlds. 0 0
93

94

95

See id. at 68-69.
Thagard, supra note 5, at 87.
KUHN, supra note 88, at 70-72.

96 See NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 41-43 (questioning whether we are in a world
in which maximum parsimony is the best guide to truth).
97 See NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 337-41.
98 See KUHN, supra note 88, at 104; LiPTON, supra note 5, at 122.

9 See KuHN, supra note 88, at 103-04.
100 See SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 124-26 (describing experiments to
measure Avogadro's number).
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4. Unification. The purpose of explanation is seeking understanding, and an aspect of understanding is conceptual economy.1 0 1 To
explain a phenomenon is to fit it within a coherent whole.1 0 2 This
means, in many cases, reducing one kind of explanatory consideration
to another, more fundamental one. Our understanding is enhanced
if we can show that a number of seemingly independent phenomena
actually can all be explained in terms of one overarching principle.10 3
Newtonian physics, for example, explained both the principles of terrestrial motion elucidated by Galileo and Kepler's laws of planetary
motion.' 0 4 Similarly, the kinetic theory of gases enabled unification
of several natural laws that were previously deemed independent.10 5
5. Empirical adequacy. A scientific explanation must account for
observed phenomena. 0 6 This is not the same as asserting that science
aims at truth. There may be aspects of reality that lie behind observations-the unobservable realm that includes not only postulated particles and forces, but also includes the scientific laws that describe
relations among them. Antirealists (and constructive empiricists like
Bas van Fraassen) assert that empirical adequacy is enough and that
science should not make promises on which it cannot deliver, such as
providing explanations that are true of reality.' 0 7 Realists such as Hilary Putnam reply that, unless scientific explanations did "track truth,"
it would be hard to account for their success in making predictions. 0 8
Realists and antirealists are united, however, in believing that science
is necessarily "all about" disciplining belief by comparing it with observation 09 and that what differentiates science from various kinds of
pseudoscience as well as humanistic inquiries is that critical evaluation
and revision is motivated, at least in part, by accounting for
observation. 110
101

Psittos, CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION, supra note 66, at 265.

See id.
See HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, at 83 ("What scientific explanation ... aims
at is . .. an objective kind of insight that is achieved by [a] systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of common underlying structures and processes
that conform to specific, testable, basic principles."); Philip Kitcher, Explanatoy Unification,
in THEORIES OF EXPLANATION, supra note 5, at 167, 167.
104
NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 127.
1o5 Michael Friedman, Explanationand Scientific Understanding,in THEORIES OF EXPLANATION, supra note 5, at 188, 195.
106
See NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 55-56, 74-77.
107
See id. at 341.
102
103

108
Id. at 341-44 (discussing Putnam's "no miracles argument" and considering
whether it is IBE, only at the metamethodological level).

109

See id. at 55.

110 The principle of demarcation, differentiating science from nonscience, is associated with the work of Karl Popper, although it is an important background norm in the
philosophy of science overall. See generally KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY (1959). For an overview of the history of the demarcation principle, see NOLA &
SANKEY, supra note 5, at 253-74. In popular culture, TV shows like Mythbusters and Penn
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The task of the next section will be to generate a similar list of
explanatory virtues for law. The process of inference will be the same:
working from assumptions about the nature and purpose of the practice(science or law), we can derive criteria for what counts as doing
better or worse at offering an explanation within that domain.
II
EXPLANATION IN LAW
A.

Are Legal Explanations Functional?

It may be the case that legal explanations, of the sort we are considering here, are functional in nature. Many everyday explanations
make reference to goal-directed behavior: why did I go to Wegmans?
Because I needed to buy groceries and it's the best grocery store in
town. My conscious desire to buy groceries, coupled with my belief
that Wegmans is a good place to do this, explains my action. Where
conscious intent is absent, however, functional explanations can get a
bit mysterious, or at least metaphorical, particularly if we try to retain
causality as part of the explanation. Classical scientific explanations
made widespread appeals to teleological notions like "final causes" or
"vital forces," but modern philosophers of science are careful to avoid
invoking empirically inaccessible factors."' We may speak loosely in
terms of teleology, for example in explaining a jackrabbit's large ears
with reference to the goal of controlling the animal's temperature in
hot environments.' 12 However, in order to make this explanation scientifically respectable, it must be elaborated in terms of a mechanism
that has empirically testable implications. Causality enters the explanation indirectly, via natural selection mechanisms that favor the survival of organisms with features that confer an advantage with respect
to the goal of survival or reproduction.' 13 It is also necessary to distinguish the function of something from its accidental effects. How do
we know that the function of the jackrabbit's ears is to cool its body
temperature and not to enable it to hear better? The answer is that
we can look at features of an organism's environment and see what
characteristics of the organism are necessary to enable it to maintain
itself in proper working order. 1 4 The crucial explanatory concept
and Teller: Bullshit are dedicated to policing the boundary between science and, well,
bullshit.
I11 See CARL G. HEMPEL, The Logic ofFunctionalAnalysis, in HEMPEL, ASPECTS, supra note
42, at 297, 304 [hereinafter HEMPEL, FunctionalAnalysis]; SALMON, FOUR DECADES, SUpra
note 5, at 4, 26; Larry Wright, Functions, 82 PHIL. Rav. 139, 141 (1973).
112 The example is from SALMON, Comets, supra note 58, at 60-61.
113 See SALMON, FOUR DECADES, supra note 5, at 111-14 (discussing how behavior or a
feature of an organism can be understood causally if it has been causally efficacious in the

past at bringing about some goal).
114

See HEMPEL, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 111, at 306.
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here is some notion of the proper working order of an organism,
which in turn gains content from the goals of survival and
reproduction.
Jules Coleman provides a sophisticated model of functional explanation in law, as a preface to his own functional argument that the
tort system should be understood as being oriented around the function of corrective justice, not economic efficiency.' 15 Legal explanations generally cannot rely on intentional, goal-directed behavior
because legal doctrines do not arise from the creative act of an individual or some group whose intentions can be coherently aggregated. 1 6 In Coleman's view, an IBE argument in law is an appeal to a
kind of functional explanation:
The best explanation is the one which not only fits the shape of the
institutions or practice, but also reveals it in its best light, as the best
version of the sort of thing it purports to be (the value component).
In offering an interpretation in this sense, one needs to posit a
point, purpose or function of the institution or practice. The component parts must then be shown to hang together in a way that
makes this function or point perspicuous. Thus, the function provides a lens through which the component aspects of the practice
are seen to cohere and to be mutually supporting.' 17
He refers to this pattern of argument as a constructive interpretation
in Dworkin's sense,' 1 8 while elsewhere he claims to be a critic of Dworkin's methods.1 19 We will return to this point below; for now, the
point to notice is the possibility that the best explanation for some
feature of the law may be given in functional terms. The question is
how to cash out a functional explanation for some feature of the law,
and whether it is a distinct pattern of explanation or whether it is
really something else, like IBE.
Returning to the functional model of scientific explanation, recall that the crucial explanatory notion is some end state or goalsurvival and reproduction, in the case of biological organisms-which
enables us to distinguish the function of something from its incidental
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 25-26.
Id. Leaving aside the problem of aggregating individual intents, a statute may
sometimes be explained functionally (or purposively) in terms of some problem in response to which it was enacted. (As English lawyers would say, a statute makes sense in
light of the "mischief" it was designed to remedy. See Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep.
637 (KB.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b.) The examples given in the introduction, however, do
not appeal to the intent of an individual lawmaker or legislature and thus pose the problem we are interested in here, namely what it means to explain something more general,
like a legal doctrine.
117
Coleman, supra note 7, at 193.
115

116

118

See id.

119 See, e.g., id. at 194 (noting that "if economic analysis is an interpretive theory in the
Dworkinian sense, then it is a particularly bad one on the dimension of fit").
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effects. 120 Like the jackrabbit's ears, a feature of the law can be explained functionally if it would not have existed had the environment
been different.121 Otherwise, a putative functional explanation is
nothing more than a fable or a just-so story. Coleman argues that
proponents of the economic analysis of torts cannot avail themselves
of a functional explanation, at least for the core of tort law (although
efficiency may be the incidental by-product of other behaviors) .122 Interestingly, his argument for why this is so subtly shifts into an IBE
pattern: there are simply too many features of the common law of
torts, such as the doctrines of but-for causation and duty and its bilateral nature (victims seek redress from specific injurers), that cannot
be accounted for by an economic explanation. 123 Coleman has it
backwards: it is not that IBE explanations inevitably collapse into functional ones. Rather, functional explanations necessarily appeal to
considerations familiar from IBE arguments.
This leads directly into the next section because the question in
law, as in science, is what criteria to use in determining whether a
proposed explanation is better than its rivals or is the best explanation. 124 Here Coleman rightly notes that Dworkin has a ready answer.
A Dworkinian explanation seeks to show that a principle or doctrine
fits with existing law ("past political decisions" as Dworkin likes to say)
and also contributes to a justification of the whole area of law ("shows
the community[ ] in a better light ... from the standpoint of political
morality") .125 Integrity, for Dworkin, is not merely consistency or coherence or, if it is, it is a special kind of coherence. It is coherence
with the political morality of a particular community.126 The point,
120
121
122
123
124

See
See
See
See

supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
id. at 27.
id. at 27-28.

8,

at 26.

Unless these criteria can be specified with some degree of precision, there is a
danger that the evaluation of doctrinal legal scholarship is inherently subjective and, therefore, susceptible to unconscious biases. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 894 & n.13, 895-96
(arguing that the evaluation of legal scholarship tends to be mostly intuitive, in that readers find a work "insightful" or creative without being able to specify exactly what these
terms mean and with the resulting danger that idiosyncratic personal reactions may determine the reputation of a scholar).
125
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 217-18, 225-28, 230-31, 239-40, 248-49,
255. For a helpful summary of Dworkin's position, see Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the
Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 588,
608 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) ("[T]he methodology requires that the

deliberator seek that set of general principles (theory) that makes the best overall sense of
law, such that the principles not only imply the more specific rules or decisions under
review but also show them to be justified (for this the principles must approximate true or
rationally warranted principles of morality). Alternative principles are ranked according to
the extent to which they 'fit' the legal data and 'appeal' from a moral point of view.").
126
See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 243 ("Law as integrity asks judges to
assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles
about justice and fairness and procedural due process . . . . But . . . integrity does not
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purpose, or function of the legal doctrine is necessarily connected
with moral considerations.1 27 Dworkin's approach provides a straightforward answer to the question, "what makes an explanation better?"
His answer is that an explanation is better than its rivals if it shows how
a legal doctrine makes sense in light of some purpose or function that
is, itself, morally attractive.12s In his explanation for the recoverability
by bystanders of damages for emotional distress, Dworkin refers to criteria of theory selection such as consilience,' 2 9 but it is clear that most
of the explanatory work is being done by considerations of political
morality, such as whether "people [ought to be] entitled to be compensated fully whenever they are injured by others' carelessness," or
whether that principle is "a radical view not shared by any substantial
portion of the public and unknown in the political and moral rhetoric
of the times."13 0 We can call this a functional explanation, with the
function given by some political end, but it is clearer to acknowledge
this as something closer to a normative explanation.
The Dworkinian approach to explanation reveals the connection
between jurisprudential theories and legal explanation. In order to
determine what is a good explanation in law, we have to make some
background presuppositions about the point of law. For Dworkin, the
point of law is, roughly speaking, to constitute and sustain a special
kind of political community-a community of principle, in which citizens regard each other as equals and accept obligations of mutual
concern among themselves."s' A putative explanation of some legal
doctrine should therefore be rejected if it does not cohere with an
overall scheme of principles of political morality that are presupposed
by the community's laws.13 2 Dworkin strenuously denies subscribing
to a natural law stance, 3 3 but it is difficult to see how this is really a
legal positivist position if one of the criteria for the adequacy of a legal
explanation is coherence with moral principles. The point here is not
to enter into debates between natural law and positivism, or inclusive
and exclusive positivism. Rather, the goal for the remainder of this
recommend ... that we should all be governed by the same goals and strategies .. . and [it]
does not frown on this diversity.").
127
See COLEMAN, PRACrICE OF PIUNCIPLE, supra note 8, at 29-30.
128
See DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 244.
129
See id. at 247 (arguing that his ideal judge Hercules "must take into account not
only the numbers of decisions counting for each interpretation [i.e. enumerative induction], but whether the decisions expressing one principle seem more important or fundamental or wide-ranging than the decisions expressing the other.").
130
Id. at 249.
131
Id. at 166, 185-90, 198-202, 211-15 (noting that "[wie have a duty to honor our
responsibilities under social practices that define groups and attach special responsibilities
to membership").
132
Id. at 211.
133
See RONALD DwOluN, TAING RIGHTs SElUOUSLY app. at 325-26 (6th prtg. 1979) (A
Reply to Critics).
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Essay is to develop the connections between the explanations generally offered by legal scholars and working assumptions about the nature and function of the law. In the background will be the question
posed by Dworkin, namely whether it is necessary for legal theory to
reach outside the law-to considerations that belong to the domain of
morality-in order to offer an explanation of anything within the law.
The principal task, however, will be to analyze some of the rhetoric of
doctrinal legal scholarship, and hopefully to learn something about
the jurisprudential positions presupposed by these arguments.
B.

What Good Are Legal Explanations?

Everyone has heard the explanation given by Willie Sutton for
why he robbed banks: "that's where the money is."13 4 Social scientist
Alan Garfinkel retells that story and situates it in the context of an
interview with a priest who was trying to reform Sutton. 35 The priest
wanted to know why Sutton robbed banks, as opposed to, say, depositing money in them; Sutton was explaining why he robbed banks, not,
for example, old farmhouses. The point of this version of the story is
that an explanation really only counts relative to a context.13 6 The
Sutton story also shows that the context is often contrastive. We want
to know, "why this rather than that?"' 3 7 The idea of context-specific,
contrastive explanation will be important in understanding legal explanations. Recall that the modifier "best" in "inference to the best
explanation" is given content relative to the aims of science.' 3 8 It is
not enough to say simply that science aims to understand and explain
because these are the very ideas we are trying to understand. Rather,
we have to consider the characteristics and virtues of science as a practice, and from those considerations derive criteria for a good (or "the
best") scientific explanation.1 3 9
Like the priest and Willie Sutton, science often defines its aims
negatively. A scientific explanation is, among other things, one that
supra note 5, at 21.
Id.
136
An example to which all parents can relate is from LivroN, supra note 5, at 33.
When the author asked his three-year-old son why he threw his food on the floor, his son
answered that he was full. The author, of course, was asking why the three-year-old threw
his food on the floor rather than leaving it on his plate, so the explanation failed to satisfy
the relevant "why?" question.
137
See GARFINKEL, supra note 5, at 28-41 (noting that when we ask why the sky is blue,
we "are really asking of the sky why it is blue rather than some other color"); vAN FRAASSEN,
THE ScIEN'-rwic IMAGE, supra note 5, at 126-29 (noting that the correct general, underlying
structure of a why-question is "Why (is it the case that) P in contrast to (other members of)
X?," where X is a set of alternatives).
138
Cf NoLA & SANKEY, supra note 5, at 32 (noting that our values enter into our decisions about science, particularly our acceptance or rejection of theories).
139
See, e.g., id. at 123-30 (exploring different theories of "what is meant by being a
better explanation").
134

13

GARFINKEL,
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avoids appeals to final causes, vital forces, or general bunkum.140
Consider, for example, the notorious unscientific explanation, offered by a character in a Moliere play, that opium puts people to sleep
because it contains a dormitive principle, or the Aristotelian idea that
nature abhors a vacuum. If a method of inquiry is to deserve the label
science, it must answer to criteria of empirical adequacy.1 4 1 In particular, it must be general, capable of supporting counterfactuals, and
above all, it must make claims that purport to be true or false with
reference to something external; that is, science must relate to the
natural world in some way. In this way we can see the relationship
between the aims of science, considered at a very general level, and
criteria that can be used to assess the adequacy of scientific explanations and adjudicate among rival explanations. The criteria for theory-acceptance, which support a conclusion that one theory or
another is the best explanation, are themselves justified with reference to the virtues of scientific inquiry.
At the risk of sounding grandiose, I believe a criteria of theoryacceptance in legal scholarship can (and indeed must) be derived
from higher-order characteristics and virtues of legal reasoning as a
practice. Start with a historical illustration (one which, I take it, no
one accepts anymore): Grant Gilmore describes how Langdell subscribed to both an ideological claim about law, that it was timeless and
unchanging, and a methodological thesis, that the goal of the legal
scholar should be progressive simplification, reducing the unruly plurality of doctrines to a small number of higher-order principles.14 2 As
in science, it remains to be demonstrated why theoretical consilience
"tracks truth" in legal analysis; nevertheless, the great Langdellian
metatheoretical imperative was to show that a single overarching concept like torts could explain seemingly disparate phenomena like liability for battery, negligence, conversion, misrepresentation, fraud,
and so on.143 Holmes, by contrast, had a metatheoretical commitment to messiness, but avowed substantive jurisprudential positions of
sweeping breadth; again, the relationship between these stances was
never clarified. 144
The question for modern legal scholars is what they take the relationship to be, between substantive claims about what law is, or what it
is for, and methodological theses about how one justifies a legal explanation. Consider the familiar example of law and economics, as applied to tort law. The economic explanation of various doctrines (the
See
See
142
See
143
See
concepts).
144 Id.
140
141

FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 111, at 304.
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
GRATr GiumoRE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAw 42-48 (1977).
id. at 46 (noting the development of the word "tort" to cover a range of
HEMPEL,

at 48-56.
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causation requirement, the reasonable care standard, etc.) is that they
contribute to the goal of social welfare maximization.14 5 To argue for
this explanation, one shows that efficiency is an ideal that transcends
the various doctrines and holds them together.146 This is the Langdellian imperative, to show how seemingly disparate phenomena can be
demonstrated to be instances of a more general concept. What is not
Langdellian in this argument is the tacit appeal to "the independent
moral attractiveness of the goal of efficiency." 14 7 That kind of appeal
belongs to a more Dworkinian style of analysis. Thus, when one argues against an economic interpretation of tort law, the underlying
methodology of the argument reveals one's jurisprudential commitments. It is possible, of course, to challenge directly the normative
attractiveness of efficiency.' 4 8 Interestingly, however, most critics of
the economic analysis of torts do not take this tack. A different strategy would be to concede or bracket the moral value of welfare maximization, but to attempt to demonstrate that it does not provide the
best explanation for tort law as a whole or various tort doctrines. This
is the most prominent critical methodology in the tort theory literature, associated with the work of many corrective-justice and civil-recourse theorists.1 49 Their argument is that law and economics fails as
an explanation because it does not account for many of the observed
features of tort law.
In an interpretive or normative discipline, the idea that we
should test a theory against observations (in this case, features of legal
doctrine) is known as seeking reflective equilibrium.15 0 In a moral
145

See, e.g.,

GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS

26

(1970); Louis KAPLOW &

STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 86 (2002); WILLIAM M.

LANDES & RICHARD A.

LAw 16 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Wealth
Maximization and Tort Law: A PhilosophicalInquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAw 99, 111 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (showing that a system of tort law guided toward
wealth maximization is consistent with the moral traditions of society).
146
Posner, supranote 145, at 103 (noting that wealth maximization resonates well with
several moral theories and offends none).
147
COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 30.
148
See, e.g., RONALD M. DwoIoN, Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra
note 8, at 237, 237 (noting that the "normative failures of [economic analysis of the law]
are so great that they cast doubt on its descriptive claims").
149
See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 1-6 (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 3-4 (1995) (noting that some theorists "[i]nstead of emphasizing
goals such as wealth maximization or market deterrence . . . champion liberty or community" (footnotes omitted)); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 917, 918 (2010) (arguing that tort law is a law of wrongs and recourse); Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 1857, 1858 (2004) (examining tort law from a fairness perspective); Stephen R. Perry,
The Moral Foundationsof Tort Law, 77 IowA L. REV. 449, 450 (1992) (examining the moral
foundations of tort law). See generally Richard W. Wright, Substantive Correctivejustice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 625 (1992) (discussing corrective and distributive justice).
150
See Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibriumand Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J.
PHIL. 256, 271 (1979). The methodology of reflective equilibrium was made prominent by
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT

1062

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1035

theory, one begins with considered moral judgments and works from
the bottom up to arrive at sets of moral principles that can be inferred
from given background theories. Including background theories ensures that a set of moral principles is not an accidental generalization,
but instead is connected with wider normative and epistemological
concepts.1 51 Theories can then be evaluated for plausibility with reference to "the whole system of interconnected theories already found
acceptable."1 5 2 Significantly, considered moral judgments are not
deemed self-evident, incorrigible, or inflexible, and may be revised if
they cannot be squared with moral principles. 15 3 The ideal end of this
process is a type of coherence among (1) pretheoretical moral judgments about right and wrong, justice and injustice, etc.; (2) a set of
principles that systematizes these judgments; and (3) various normative and empirical background theories. In order to achieve this coherence, it may be necessary to reject a pretheoretical moral
judgment, no matter how certain it initially appears. "[W]e are constantly making plausibility judgments about which of our considered
moral judgments we should revise in light of theoretical considerations at all levels."1 54
Theoretical explanation in law may proceed along similar lines.
A theorist begins with an initial set of materials that are taken as given.
In law, these materials are decided cases, principles, and lines of doctrine.15 5 In torts, for example, the observed data to be explained inRawls. SeeJoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 48-51 (1971). See generallyJohn Rawls, Outline
of a Decision Procedurefor Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177 (1951).
151
"Considered" moral judgments are not merely intuitions, but those initial judgments that have been "filtered" to screen out judgments made under conditions that may
be conducive to errors. Daniels, supra note 150, at 258, 266. In this way they are quite
different from the moral intuitions studied by social psychologists. See, e.g., Jonathan
Haidt, The EmotionalDog and Its Rational Tail: A Social IntuitionistApproach to MoralJudgment,
108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (arguing that moral intuitions come before moral judgments). The reactions observed in Haidt's subjects have not been subjected to rational
reflection and thus do not count as considered moral judgments. I am not claiming here
that reasoning is the cause of moral judgments, and in fact, I am not making any causal
claims at all. Cf id. at 815 (claiming that the social intutionist model is "an antirationalist
model only in one limited sense: It says that moral reasoning is rarely the direct cause of
moraljudgment"). The analysis here is of theory construction, not moral decision making.
152
Daniels, supra note 150, at 262.
153 RAWLs, supra note 150, at 49 (noting that "[m]oral philosophy is Socratic: we may
want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are
brought to light").
154 Daniels, supra note 150, at 267. Daniels rightly says that this is a Quinean view
about the relationship between facts (in this case, considered moral judgments instead of
nonmoral observation reports) and theories. Id. at 267 n.16. See generally WILLARD VAN
ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960). Coherence (and holism) about truth and meaning is also associated with the work of Davidson. See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO
TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 17-54 (2d ed. 2001).
155
See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 967 (1988).
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clude things like the duty requirement and exceptions such as the noduty-to-rescue rule, the recoverability or nonrecoverability of damages
for certain types of harms (such as emotional distress and pure economic losses), the requirement of showing a causal connection between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiffs harm, and so on.
Background theories include assumptions about the nature and function of law, which can include substantive considerations such as economic efficiency, social welfare, justice, and fairness, and procedural
virtues such as stability, determinacy, administrability, and institutional competence. Background theories may also include the sorts of
middle-level moral principles that function as familiar "policy" arguments within legal discourse.15 6 The task, then, is to arrive at an explanation that provides a satisfactory account of observations in light
of background considerations.
An instrumental explanation would show how some doctrine furthers a particular end (efficiency, say) .157 A functional explanation
would do something similar, by showing that a doctrine contributes to
the overall capacity of the law (or some particular area, like torts) to
achieve a particular end.15 8 The explanations we are dealing with
here are neither instrumental nor functional, which is what makes
them difficult to pin down. The next section will examine some of the
arguments summarized in the introduction, to see what rhetorical
"moves" theorists make, and how these are meant to connect with explanatory virtues. Many of these moves make use of a coherentist or
reflective equilibrium methodology. A coherentist explanation seeks
to bring together particulars-cases and doctrines and such-with
broader principles and theoretical considerations, and to show how
the whole apparatus hangs together.1 59 The argument that a legal
rule or principle cannot be "all about" some consideration often
trades on the inability of that explanation to account for other features of the relevant doctrine. To the extent these arguments make
reference to coherence only with other aspects of legal doctrine, they
are consistent with legal positivism. One might say they are also consistent with a Langdellian view of the autonomy of legal reasoning. It
may be possible to study the law from a Langdellian perspective if one
were concerned only with establishing coherent theories that took
due account of the body of decided cases. My hypothesis in approaching these scholarly works, however, was that coherence is not the only
156 Coleman argues, for example, that there is an intuitive difference between "misfortunes owing to human agency and those which are no one's responsibility," and this helps
explain features of tort law such as the malfeasance vs. nonfeasance distinction. COLEMAN,
PRACTrICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 44.
157
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 145, at 111.
158
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
159 Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1704.
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consideration relevant to theory-acceptance and that many arguments
within doctrinal legal scholarship tacitly appeal to quasi-aesthetic criteria such as simplicity, elegance, and other virtues that go toward
making a theoretical explanation "lovely." Doctrinal arguments may
also appeal, tacitly or explicitly, to moral criteria. Whether this is an
embarrassment for the proffered theory or a virtue of it depends on
whether one believes that law should be methodologically pure or formal in some way, 16 0 or whether law is inescapably a practice of making
arguments that, at some level, trade on moral and political evaluative
considerations.1 6 1
To answer the question in this section's title, "what are legal explanations for?," metatheoretical considerations of the type we are examining here are relevant as disciplining rules of a practice. When
lawyers talk about concepts like legal validity or legitimacy, they appeal to normative standards that establish constraints as to what arguments lawyers can make, how judges should decide cases, and what
laws legislators should pass. I have argued that rule-of-law considerations structure the ethics of lawyers, not only when they act as advocates but when they serve as transactional advisors or legal
counselors.1 62 Ben Zipursky has argued that legal theory has become
liberated from the need to answer to higher-order philosophical concerns such as truth, knowledge, and objectivity. 163 If this is the case,
however, it is incumbent upon legal theorists to provide an accounta metatheory-of how legal reasoners of all types are supposed to
know when they have arrived at the best theoretical explanation of the
law. It seems to me that there are two possibilities here: either legal
scholars follow Dworkin, and agree that the best legal explanation is
one that displays the virtue of integrity,16 4 or they run from Dworkin
and try to find refuge in some kind of repackaged Langdellianism. As
the next section shows, however, even in actual empirical science, to
say nothing of Langdell's widely mocked claim that law can be treated
as a science, criteria for theory-acceptance often go beyond purely empirical matters and incorporate normative considerations such as aesthetics. Given that theory construction is necessarily normative, the
focus should be on finding the right theoretical virtues. Dworkin's
160

Cf STANLEY FISH, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THERE's No SUCH
GOOD THING, Too 141, 141 (1994) (imputing to lawmetaphorically, obviously, while literally referring to legal theorists-the desire not "to
have recourse to [any] supplementary discourse" that would compromise the law's
autonomy).
THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A

161
162

See DwomuN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 243.

164

See DwoPuaN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 225-75.

W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Advising and the Rule of Law, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICs: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 45, 53 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); W. Bradley
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation,99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1198 (2005).
163 Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1714-16.
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argument is that the primary theoretical virtue of law is the special
kind of coherence he calls integrity, which consists of the right kind of
overlap between legal principles and the community's moral principles, reflecting a way that the state can treat citizens with respect. 165 It
remains to be seen whether doctrinal legal scholarship offers criteria
for theory selection that have the same kind of normative
attractiveness.
C.

Theory-Acceptance in Law

Barton Beebe's paper on intellectual property argues that preserving the ability of people to use consumption to signal their status
is an explanation for intellectual property laws. 166 The paper is a tour
deforce of IBE methods. The hypothesis that intellectual property laws
function as a sumptuary code depends on the following observations:
people apparently have a need to differentiate themselves by status
and thus establish a social hierarchy, and one way to do this is through
consumption. 6 7 However, market failures imperil the capacity of
consumption to signal class distinctions. Simply purchasing more expensive stuff is wasteful; it leads to mutually offsetting expenditures
that leave everyone in the same place, in terms of their relative status-a classic arms race. 168 In addition, it is now possible to copy expensive items relatively inexpensively; if one can readily purchase a
South Korean "super copy" of a Chanel handbag, 6 9 then Chanel bags
lose their ability to differentiate their owners from others. The result
is overwhelming noise in the market and the inability to set oneself
apart from others. 70 Beebe's argument is that intellectual property
laws have certain features that are best explained as a social response
to the challenge that arms-race-type market failures and the ease of
copying pose for the maintenance of social hierarchies. The two most
noteworthy features are antidilution protection and the protection of
geographic origin designations for wine, food, and other products in
which a significant component of the perceived value is related to its
origin.1 7 ' The best way to account for these features is by positing that
See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
166 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 815.
167 Id. at 813, 820. This observation requires its own IBE argument, inferring from the
existence of sumptuary laws throughout history to an explanation in terms of a social need
for consumption-based systems of creating class distinctions. See id. at 812-13.
168 Id. at 814, 825-27.
169 Id. at 818 & n.33 (also referring to super copies as "genuine fakes"). California and
other New World winemakers' "Champagne" presents a similar problem. See id. at 832.
170 Beebe describes the problem as follows: "[T]he majority of consumers would likely
confront a marketplace consisting of goods that will set them apart only briefly, if at all,
before quickly being copied and rendered commonplace." Id. at 837.
171
Id. at 816, 869-71. Antidilution protection prevents the use of a trademark even if
there is no possibility of confusion regarding the origin of the good or service, for example
165
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intellectual property is "about," at least in part, the regulation of consumption to preserve status hierarchies.1 7 2
In the case of diluted trademarks, the harm really is not a diminution in the creator's incentive to produce the product. Selling Tylenol
snowboards does not take away from any incentives the manufacturer
of Tylenol has to make safe, effective pain relievers. Thus, the existence of antidilution protection is an anomaly that cannot be explained with reference to preserve the incentive to innovate. 173 Like
successful scientific explanations, the explanans in a legal explanation
should be able to account for a wide variety of observed phenomena.
On the IBE pattern of inference, a hypothesis H is to be preferred
over its rival H* if it better accounts for the observed evidence E;, E2,
... . 174 To "better" account for the evidence means, in part, to be
able to unify the observations under one higher-order concept. Picking up on the theoretical virtues of consilience and explanatory unification, a common move in doctrinal legal criticism is to fault a
competing theory for failing to account for an important aspect of
existing doctrine. Beebe's argument for the sumptuary explanation
trades primarily on the failure of the incentives explanation as a unifying concept. The object of protection is the prestige associated with a
mark, and there is no way to account for that interest if we assume
that intellectual property law is all about creating incentives. 175
Pointing to the inability of an explanation to account for an observed feature of a doctrine is a staple of the criticism of law and economics in tort theory. One of the observed features of tort law is its
bilateralism. Rights to redress arise only upon a showing that a particular actor, the defendant, harms a particular victim, the plaintiff.17 6
In this way torts is differentiated from small-scale accident compensain the marketing of "Tylenol snowboards, Netscape sex shops, and Harry Potter dry cleaners." Id. at 846 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir.
2002)). Geographic origin designations protect descriptions such as Champagne and Burgundy from being appropriated by producers outside a particular area, using unapproved
processes. Id. at 869-70.
172 Beebe concedes that one purpose of intellectual property law remains the prevention of misappropriation and thus the creation of incentives for technological and artistic
innovation. Id. at 813. It is clear, however, that he wants to claim pride of place for his
explanation in terms of sumptuary regulation. Antidilution and authenticity protection,
he writes, "operate according to assumptions that run contrary to nearly everything we
conventionally believe about the nature of intellectual property and the purposes of intellectual property law." Id at 817.
173

174
175

See id. at 847.

See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
Beebe, supra note 18, at 886-87.
176
COLEMAN, PRACriCE OF PRINCIPLE, supfa note 8, at 16. For a similar criticism of the
economic analysis of contract law based on its inability to account for bilateralism of remedies, see Nathan B. Oman, The Failureof Economic Interpretationsof the Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 829, 851-53 (2007).
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tion schemes like workers' compensation1 77 and the system established to redress vaccine-related harms,17 8 and comprehensive ones
such as that administered by the New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation.1 7 9 The trouble with the economic analysis of tort
law, contend its critics, is that it cannot account for bilateralism.
"There is simply no principled reason, on the economic analysis, to
limit the defendant or plaintiff classes to injurers and their respective
victims."18 0 Bilateralism is thus an observed phenomenon that cannot
be brought within the unifying framework of economic analysis.18 1 It
is troublesome for the theory, and for this reason I term it a recalcitrant observation.
Thomas Kuhn showed how a sufficient number of recalcitrant observations can lead scientists to reformulate their explanations, but he
also showed how "normal science" can remain untroubled by these
observations for a long time if there is a way to account for the observations within the existing paradigm. 18 2 The interesting thing about
this history is that recalcitrance can serve as the trigger for wholesale
theory revision, or it can merely point out puzzles to be solved within
the theory.18 3 In reflective equilibrium in ethics, neither considered
moral judgments nor ethical theories have an a priori claim to precedence.18 4 A theory may have to be revised to account for considered
moral judgments, but it also may be necessary to regard some of our
considered moral judgments as wrong. Bilateralism may be deemed a
recalcitrant feature of torts that tells against economic theories, but it
also may simply be the case that no one has yet worked out an adequate economic explanation for the fact that plaintiffs sue defined
defendants and seek tort remedies. Alternatively, the lack of fit between bilateralism and economic explanations may be a consideration
that tells against the existing doctrine, which ought to be reformed in
the name of increasing efficiency. Note that this latter approach is
not really an explanation of law, but what I earlier called a frankly
177
See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVEs 816-38 (8th ed.
2006) (discussing workers' compensation).
178 Id. at 863-65 (discussing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-300aa-34
(2006))).
179 For a description of the program, see the ACC website, http://www.acc.co.nz/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2010).
180 Coleman, supra note 7, at 186.
181
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 17-19.
182 KUHN, supra note 88, at 64, 68-72 (recounting examples of crisis and paradigm
shift within astronomy and chemistry).

183
See id. at 79 (pointing out that certain astronomical observations were counterinstances for Copernicus but merely puzzles for adherents to Ptolemaic cosmology).
184
See Daniels, supra note 150, at 257.
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normative argument, seeking the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law on the basis of some extralegal consideration.1 85
The term "extralegal" suggests that the difference between
frankly normative appeals for changing existing law and arguments
that trade on explanatory or metatheoretic concerns has to do with
the status of the norms to which the argument appeals. One of the
most important problems in jurisprudence is the relationship between
law and morality. Section II set forth several criteria for theory selection in the natural sciences: a theory is to be preferred when it explains more of the observed evidence, E;, E2 , . . . E., than its rivals. A
theory should be preferred over its rivals if it makes use of fewer independent postulates, axioms, fundamental principles, or entities than
are necessary to enable the theory to explain some observation, E,. A
theory should enable us to say significant things, generate insights,
and it should have implications for future research. A scientific explanation must account for observed phenomena. Similar theory-selection criteria apply in legal theory, but a further question remains
regarding the content of the raw data, El, E2 , . . . E,, which must be
taken into account, and from which we may conclude that one explanation is more consilient, fruitful, simple, etc., than its rivals. Legal
theorizing is distinguished from normative theorizing generally by its
careful attention to the boundary between considerations that count
in favor of a conclusion of law and those which are somehow external
to the rhetorical practices of legal reasoning. To illustrate, consider
one of the arguments summarized briefly in the introduction.
David Luban wishes to argue that the attorney-client privilege
and the related duty of confidentiality are all about protecting human
dignity.18 6 The traditional argument for confidentiality and privilege
is utilitarian. Unless lawyers can offer their clients an ironclad guarantee that they will not disclose what they learn in the course of representation, clients will not trust that they can be candid and thus will
withhold information that could be crucial to their case.1 87 Lawyers
will not only be less able to prepare effective cases in litigated matters,
but without a relationship of trust and confidence, they may also be
unable to give their clients candid advice that will lead to compliance
with the law.188 Luban questions whether this is the best explanation
for the law of confidentiality and privilege. His argument relies on
185 The language here is borrowed from FED. R. Crv. P. 11 and is meant to underscore
the distinction between explaining existing law and seeking to change existing law.
186 LUBAN, supra note 28, at 80.
187

See id. (noting that the "familiarjustification of these doctrines lies in the concern

that without confidentiality, clients will be chilled from telling their lawyers what the lawyers need to know to represent them").
188 The most powerful argument along these lines is Monroe Freedman's. SeeMONROE
H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SmrrH, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETIcs 127-40 (2d ed. 2002).
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the situation of a client with guilty knowledge of some sort, seeking
legal representation. The client would be faced with an agonizing
choice to either lie to his lawyer, withhold the information, or reveal
the secret to his lawyer knowing it will be disclosed. The effect, says
Luban, is essentially coerced self-incrimination. 89 Norms against selfincrimination have constitutional status in the United States, of
course, but the further question is what deep, underlying value is expressed in both the Fifth Amendment and the attorney-client privilege. Luban's argument is that there is a unifying concept of human
dignity at work, which has effects in diverse areas of law: "[t]o be a
witness against yourself means to assume the disinterested outsider's
stance toward your own condemnation."' 9 0 This same conception of
dignity also explains the permissibility of so-called Alford pleas, in
which a criminal defendant pleads guilty but denies having committed
the crime charged.1 9 1
Notice the tacit appeal to theoretical consilience here. The dignity-based explanation has greater power than the utilitarian explanation because it is better able to unify seemingly diverse phenomena:
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the duty of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, and the practice of Alford
pleas. The other quite crucial feature of this explanation is that the
value of human dignity here is not a general moral philosopher's
value, but a specifically legal notion of dignity, derived from its expression in legal norms. Luban identifies the wrong of humiliation, the
assault on the value of dignity, as involving someone in "an extraordinary kind of self-alienation, as if the only interest you have in the matter is the state's interest in ascertaining the truth and apportioning
blame."19 2 The explanation appealing to the value of dignity exhibits
theoretical consilience over a particular domain. The "evidence" to
be explained, El, E2 , . . . E., is the way in which the legal system protects important human interests in various contexts. None of the bits
of evidence, E,,, includes extralegal philosophical conceptions of dignity. One might refer to dignity as involving self-respect, social honor,
freedom from control, or behaving in a manner that reflects one's
self-esteem.19 3 Luban does not start with this kind of ordinary language analysis, however, but looks to the way in which the value of
dignity is instantiated in legal protections that can be understood as
aimed at preserving human dignity.19 4 In terms of logical form, dig189

LuBAN, supra note 28, at 81-82.

190
191
192

Id at 83.
Id. at 85-86. The original case is North Carolinav. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
LUBAN, supra note 28, at 83.
AvisHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 43-46, 51-53, 72-73 (Naomi Goldblum
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trans., 1996).
194
See LunAN, supra note 28, at 88.
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nity is not a premise in a deductive justification of a legal norm. Instead, it is the conclusion of an inference to the best explanation for
the content of legal norms.
Not just any appeal to consilience will do. Many things can be
unified under one overarching explanatory concept, but a good theory will do so in a way that conveys a sense that order has been created
out of apparent chaos. There is an inevitable aesthetic dimension to
evaluating a legal explanation. Some appeals to consilience have an
additional, admittedly hard to theorize, quality of elegance. Luban's
use of criminal defense advocacy, compelled self-incrimination, and
Alford pleas is elegant in its invocation of contexts in which the reader
intuitively feels that the same kinds of values are at stake. The image
of the lonely, frightened, friendless criminal defendant is a staple of
the justifying narratives offered by lawyers.19 5 The value inherent in
the attorney-client privilege is therefore linked with an image that has
considerable power elsewhere in the law, such as the context of the
criminal defendant facing the power of the state and the possibility of
compelled self-incrimination. On the other hand, some attempts at
unification feel ad hoc or strained. The first article cited in the introduction, on anticommodification as an explanation of the consideration doctrine in contract law, attempts to unify some of our intuitions
about promises (e.g., that a promise to take one's significant other out
for dinner conveys affection and should not be handled using the
same norms that apply to a promise to deliver goods on time) by appealing to an explanatory concept that seems to be doing very different work in unrelated areas of the law. 196 Why do we prohibit a
market in infant adoption or donor organs? Because some things
should just not be the subject of market transactions. 197 That seems
to have little to do with the consideration doctrine in contract law,
which applies to promises with respect to transactions where there is
no intuitive sense that market-based norms are inappropriate. This
explanation lacks the quality of elegance because it feels like it cobbles together bits and pieces of legal doctrine without any prior relationship to each other.

195

See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The MoralFoundationsof the Lawyer-Client

Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (describing the popular concept of a lawyer as a client's
legal friend).
196 Gamage & Kedem, supra note 2, at 1302-03.
197 The authors cite Carol Rose for the proposition that one can (and should) bring a
bottle of wine to the host of a dinner party but to bring an equivalent amount of cash
would cause serious offense. See id. at 1325 (citing Carol M. Rose, Whither Commodification?
(Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 84; Ctr. for Law,
Econ. and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 308, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=706644#%23.

2011]

EXPLANATION IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

1071

An elegant explanation also avoids treating relatively inconsequential doctrinal wrinkles as major counterinstances that require
wholesale theoretical revision. The invocation of anticommodification norms is supposed to explain why nominal consideration is permitted by contract law while alternative forms of promising that
convey the parties' intention to be bound (such as using a seal) are
not.19 8 It is certainly a puzzle why contract law treats a peppercorn as
adequate consideration while using a seal is treated as a "mere formality," not satisfying the consideration requirement.1 9 9 But it is not a
serious puzzle, requiring an elaborate explanation in terms of taboos
around monetizing all aspects of human relationships. Sometimes
puzzles can be left as puzzles. On the other hand, a theory may be
faulted if a puzzle is serious enough and the theory fails to address it.
It is difficult to give non-question-begging explanations of the requirement in tort law that the plaintiff show actual causation,2 0 0 but a theory of torts that glossed over the requirement of showing causation,
treating it as a puzzling anomaly but not worthy of sustained analysis,
would be a deficient one. The difference between a certain feature of
the doctrine and a curious outlier is, itself, not easy to theorize, but it
will be apparent to anyone with experience with the relevant area of
law. It will appear as a paradigm, not in the sense in which that word
is used by Kuhn, but in a sense familiar to lawyers. A paradigm case
illustrates a general principle in its most obvious form. If the principle means anything, it must mean that the paradigm case comes out
in the way it did. 2 01 If a theory cannot account for a paradigm case, so
much the worse for the theory. On the other hand, as a case gets
farther away from the paradigm case, the more latitude a theorist has
to treat it as a mere puzzle.
Elegance is an aesthetic value, which illustrates Peter Lipton's
claim that a scientist relying on IBE seeks the loveliest explanation for
observations. 202 If this is the case even in the natural sciences, then in
an inherently normative discipline like law, which depends for its legitimacy on persuasive connections between past events and present
rights and duties, explanation should be understood as similar to literary and artistic criticism. Taken at face value, this is a fairly banal
point. Scholars have been arguing for a long time that legal argument
198
199
200

Id. at 1321.
See, e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127 (one vol. ed. 1952).
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL

FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw, supra note 145, at 387, 398.
201

See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY A HISTORY OF

MORAL REASONING 252 (1988). Cass Sunstein talks about "fixed points" in legal doctrine,
referring to the same phenomenon as a paradigm case. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 69-71 (1996).
202
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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is an interpretive practice,20 3 so it would appear to follow that legal
theory also must be understood in terms of rhetoric. As noted at the
outset, it is widely assumed that law belongs to the domain of practical
reason and cannot be assessed using scientific methods. 2 0 4 The legal
theorist who has best captured the unscientific, but not unrigorous,
theoretical foundations of the law is Dworkin, with his insistence that
judicial decisions respect the value of integrity. Dworkin's critics,
most prominently Stanley Fish, have noted that he sometimes struggles to avoid collapsing interpretation into eitherjudicial subjectivism
or the recovery of the "true" meaning of texts. 2 0 5 According to Fish, a
judge who respects the virtue of integrity is merely doing what judges
do, which is to say using whatever rhetorical devices judges use in order to make their opinions persuasive. 206 Fish, the mischievous antitheoretician,20 7 wants to deny that anything we say at the level of
theory is useful to practice, so he would undoubtedly be doubly skeptical of metatheory.
This is a bit unfair to Dworkin, however, who makes a substantive
claim along with a methodological one. Dworkin's substantive claim
is that integrity must respect both past political decisions and the community's moral principles. 208 He is not telling judges merely to do
whatever they were doing but reminding them that the legitimacy of
adjudication depends on a certain kind of connection between their
decisions and wider moral concerns. It is certainly the case that Dworkin resists foundationalism. 2 0 9 He does not, however, deny the objectivity of legal judgments. Indeed, his work has consistently connected
203
See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, Judicial Opinions as Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE
255, 255 (rev. and enlarged ed. 1998); JAMES BOYD WHITE, Reading Law and Reading Literature: Law as Language, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAw
77, 77 (1985); Jessica Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE 269, 269 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Although the word
"interpretation" is perhaps more common, I use the term "criticism" to distinguish the
problem of interpretation in most analytic jurisprudence, which is concerned more with
questions such as the relationship between texts and meaning, the problem of objectivity,
and whether intention is relevant to interpretation. See generally LAw AND INTERPRETATION:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (examining whether recent methodological developments in interpretation are good).
204
POSNER, supra note 203, at 272.
205 See STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LrTERARY AND LEGAL STUDIEs 87, 91-94 (1989) [hereinafter DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY).
206
See STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY,

supra note 205, at 356, 357.
207
See STANLEY FISH, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 205, at 372, 372 (reporting that Dennis Martinez, a baseball pitcher, had
received advice from his manager to "[t]hrow strikes and keep 'em off the bases . .. What

else could he say?"(internal quotation marks omitted)).
208

See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.

209 See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
87, 87-88 (1996). This is a theme of his recent book,JusticeforHedgehogs. See also, e.g., Russ
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objectivity in law with political legitimacy. The central argument of
his legal theory is summarized in a passage in Law's Empire
According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they
figure in or follow from the principles ofjustice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation
of the community's legal practice. 2 10
If one asks, "How do we know which explanation is better?," Dworkin
has a ready answer. The explanation to be preferred is the one that
makes the most satisfying fit with the community's moral principles. 2 11
A lawyer, judge, or legal scholar aims to offer an explanation that is
the best it can be, in terms of justice, fairness, and other political values. In my view, Dworkin's moralized account of theory-acceptance
shifts the burden to doctrinal legal scholars to either accept the role
of moral principles in legal explanation, or articulate metatheoretical
criteria that show why we should prefer one explanation to another,
without reference to morality.
CONCLUSION

There are two bigger issues at stake in this Essay, which I have
discussed somewhat obliquely and, I fear, incompletely out of space
constraints. One is the autonomy of nonnormative, nonpragmatic
theoretical legal scholarship as a discipline. The second is the relationship between aesthetic values and legitimacy. By autonomy, I
mean the capacity of the discipline to resist being reduced to something else; it is what Langdell meant by his claim that law could be
approached as a science, or the more modern formalist claim that
departments of law exhibit "immanent rationality" that renders the
law intelligible to the scholar orjudge.2 1 2 Legal scholars are of course
familiar with the use of disciplines such as economics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology to illuminate some problem in
the law. These disciplines offer rigor and breadth to what might otherwise be an insular, somewhat naive discipline. Here is Richard Posner on interdisciplinary scholarship:
There is still more to discomfit today's legal doctrinalist. He is a
student of texts, and the hermeneuticist has exposed the naivet6 of
legal interpretation .

. . ,

while the economist has derided the doc-

trinalist's grasp of policy and the feminist and the critical legal
Shafer-Landau, Truth and Metaethics: The Possibility of Metaethics, 90 B.U. L. REv. 479, 479
(2010) (criticizing this aspect of Dworkin's book).
210
DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 225.
211
See id. at 256.
212
See Weinrib, supra note 155, at 956, 963-65.
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scholar have exposed the unconscious biases that permeate legal
scholarship. 2' 3
Doctrinal scholarship has to be able to respond to this challenge by
establishing its methodological bona fides, and so far it has not done
so in a systematic way. If it fails to do so, there would be no reason to
respect the conclusions of these scholars or to continue to grant disciplinary autonomy to doctrinal analysis.
The deeper problem is the most plausible metatheory of doctrinal scholarship is IBE, and the essence of IBE is an aesthetic judgment
that one explanation is "lovelier" than another. 2 14 The familiar objection to IBE in the empirical sciences-that we have no reason to believe that a lovely explanation tracks truth 2 1 5-can be raised by
analogy here. The difference is that the truth claims made about scientific theories, which are underwritten by IBE arguments, cannot be
validated in other ways, so that IBE presents itself as a pretty good
alternative to doing without theories of explanation. Unlike van
Fraassen's example of the mouse in the wall, which is the best explanation for the observed mouse droppings, scratching noises, and disappearance of cheese, the postulated entities and scientific laws that
function in scientific explanations cannot be directly observed.2 16 Appeals to explanatory loveliness may be the best we can do in science.
In legal explanation, however, we do not need to infer to the existence of something unobservable or mysterious. We already have a
whole toolbox of normative concepts that bear on legal explanation,
such as efficiency, justice, fairness, equality, truth, legitimacy, and so
on. The point here is not so much that legal scholars ought all to
become pragmatists. Rather, it is merely to point out that it is curious
that so much effort in doctrinal scholarship goes into evading direct
appeals to moral ideals. In many cases, the legal explanations considered here could be recast as arguments for the desirability, in moral
and political terms, of some legal principle. That such an argument
seems to be present in an indirect, covert way suggests that legal scholarship cannot let go of moral and political arguments. To quote Stanley Fish once more, ". . . and it's a good thing, too."2 17
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